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1Simple Sentences, Substitutions, and Mistaken Evaluations1
David Braun
Jennifer Saul
Abstract:  Many competent speakers initially judge that (i) is true and (ii) is false, though
they know that (iii) is true.
(i) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.
(ii) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman.
(iii) Superman is identical with Clark Kent.
Semantic explanations of these intuitions say that (i) and (ii) really can differ in truth-
value.  Pragmatic explanations deny this, and say that the intuitions are due to misleading
implicatures.  This paper argues that both explanations are incorrect.  (i) and (ii) cannot
differ in truth-value, yet the intuitions are not due to implicatures, but rather to mistakes
in evaluating  (i) and (ii).
1.  The Puzzle
 We’ll begin with some intuitions. First, (1) seems true, while (1*) does not.
(1) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.
(1*) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman.
Next, a situation in which (2) is true could, seemingly, be one in which (2*) is false.
(2) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and Superman came out.
(2*) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and Clark Kent came out.
2The intuitions we have about these sentences are puzzling, because there are good
reasons for thinking that they are correct and also good reasons for thinking that they are
incorrect. 2
 But perhaps you did not have these intuitions. 3  No matter:  it’s undeniable that
many competent, rational, relevantly well-informed speakers who understand these
sentences do have these intuitions, at least initially--the reactions of readers to Saul
(1997) are sufficient to establish this.  The existence of such speakers is all we need to
generate the puzzle in which we are interested.  In what follows, we shall sometimes call
the intuitions of such speakers the standard or typical intuitions.  We will also continue to
assume that you had the standard intuitions.  If you did not, please assume that we are
speaking of the intuitions of some speaker who did.
 Are your intuitions about the sentences above correct or incorrect?  There are
apparently compelling reasons to think that they are incorrect.  For, obviously,  (1*) is
false.  Also, the following identity sentence is true.
 (3) Superman is identical with Clark Kent.
 But (1*) seems to follow from (3) and (1).  Thus it seems that if (1*) is false, then so is
(1), and so your intuition that (1) is true is incorrect.  A similar bit of reasoning seems to
show that your intuitions about (2) and (2*) are incorrect.4
 But there are also compelling reasons to think that your intuitions are correct.
After all, you understood sentences (1) and (1*).  You are also (we assume) a competent,
rational, and relevantly well-informed speaker.  Therefore, your judgments about the
truth-values of (1) and (1*) are likely to be correct.  Moreover, you knew that (3) is true,
and so that Superman is identical with Clark Kent; so if  (1*) really did follow from (1)
3and (3) by a simple substitution inference, then you would have inferred that (1) is false.
Similarly, you would have inferred that (2) and (2*) cannot differ in truth-value.  But you
didn’t.
 Thus there is a seemingly strong argument that your intuitions are correct, and a
seemingly strong argument that your intuitions are incorrect.  So we’re left with a puzzle:
which argument is unsound, and why?  We call this the puzzle of resistance to
substitution in simple sentences. By ‘simple sentence’, we mean a sentence that does not
contain any quotational, psychological, or other obviously non-extensional contexts.
Many other pairs of simple sentences also provoke similar anti-substitution intuitions, for
example, (4)-(5*).5
(4) Clark Kent arrived at the scene of the rescue just after Superman left.
(4*) Clark Kent arrived at the scene of the rescue just after Clark Kent left.
(5) Lex Luthor has hit Superman several times, but has never hit Clark Kent.
(5*) Lex Luthor has hit Superman several times, but has never hit Superman.
In this paper, we offer a solution to this puzzle.  According to our solution, your
intuitions about (1)-(2*), are incorrect:  (1) is false, and (2) and (2*) cannot differ in truth
value.  But the sorts of errors that we think you make are very different from those which
have been previously attributed to speakers in discussions of the above puzzle, and others
like it.
2.  Background:  Simple Sentences, Belief Sentences, and Previous Attempts to Solve
the Puzzle
4In a previous paper, Saul (1997) presented a selection of simple sentences that
provoke anti-substitution intuitions.  She argued that they pose a difficulty for theorists
who oppose neo-Russellian theories of belief sentences, such as the theories of Nathan
Salmon (1986, 1989) and Scott Soames (1988, 1995).  Salmon and Soames say that pairs
of belief sentences that differ only in containing different co-referring names, such as (6)
and (7), express the same proposition.  They say that standard intuitions that the
sentences may differ in truth-value are due to pragmatic factors.
(6) Lois believes that Superman flies.
(7) Lois believes that Clark flies.
Now consider a theorist who rejects Salmon’s and Soames’s view, on the grounds that it
conflicts with typical anti-substitution intuitions about belief sentences.  What should
such a theorist say about typical speakers’ intuitions concerning the simple sentences (1)-
(2*)?  If she says that these simple-sentence intuitions are correct, then it seems that she
must say that (1) does not follow from (1*) and (3).  Saul (1997) argued that accounts
that allow for this had implausible consequences.  But if such a theorist says that typical
speakers’ anti-substitution intuitions about simple sentences are incorrect, then she
should say why she trusts typical speakers’ anti-substitution intuitions concerning belief
sentences more than she trusts their anti-substitution intuitions concerning simple
sentences.  Furthermore, such a theorist would need to explain away typical intuitions
about the simple sentences, and (Saul claimed) would surely hypothesize pragmatic
differences between the pairs of simple sentences in order to do so.  But if this theorist
thinks that pragmatics suffices to explain the anti-substitution intuitions in the case of
5simple sentences, why does she not think that pragmatics suffices in the case of belief
sentences?
Critics of neo-Russellianism have responded to Saul’s challenge by taking up
both of the preceding options. Graeme Forbes (1997, 1999) and Joseph Moore (1999,
2000) say that the anti-substitution intuitions about simple sentences are correct; they say
that utterances of (1) and (1*) can semantically express distinct propositions that differ in
truth-value, as can (2) and (2*).6  Alex Barber (2000) maintains that the anti-substitution
intuitions for simple sentences are incorrect, and attempts to explain away incorrect
intuitions by appealing to pragmatics, arguing that his implicature-based account
combines naturally with a neo-Fregean semantics that rejects substitution in belief
reports.
Saul (1997, 1999, 2000) has criticized Forbes’s and Moore’s semantic solutions at
some length.  We think that her criticisms pose serious problems for their views.  In this
paper, however, we raise additional objections that apply to both semantic solutions (like
theirs) and implicature-based solutions (like Barber’s).  The objections turn on a feature
common to both sorts of accounts.  The objections also serve to motivate the new
solution we propose, which rejects the common feature.  On our account, standard
intuitions about simple sentences like (1)-(2*) are incorrect, but the explanation of these
mistaken intuitions does not invoke implicatures.  Thus we reject the widespread
assumption, formerly held by Saul, that any theory that says that standard intuitions are
incorrect must offer a pragmatic explanation of your intuitions.7  According to our
alternative solution, you entertained the propositions that (1)-(2*) semantically express
when you read (1)-(2*).  The propositions that (1) and (1*) semantically express are both
6false, and those that (2) and (2*) express cannot differ in truth-value.  However, your
evaluations of those propositions for truth-value, and possible differences in truth-value,
were mistaken.  Thus we call our account ‘the mistaken evaluation account’.
In what follows, we first describe the existing semantic and implicature-based
solutions to the puzzle, and present new criticisms of them.  We next expose a common
assumption of these accounts that we find dubious.  We then present our own account,
including some explanations of your mistakes in evaluation.  We end with some
comments on substitution in belief sentences.
3.  Semantic and Implicature Solutions
3.1.  Semantic Solutions
Forbes (1997, 1999) and Moore (1999, 2000) have offered accounts which are
designed to accommodate the typical intuitions about simple sentences in the most
straightforward way: by matching them.  According to them, there are situations in which
an utterance of (2) is true while an utterance of (2*) is false; and there are utterances of
(1) that are true.  When you read the inscriptions of (1)-(2*), you correctly grasped the
propositions that they semantically express, and correctly evaluated those propositions,
and that is why you gave the (correct) verdicts that you did.8
Forbes and Moore differ over exactly which propositions are expressed by
utterances of (1)-(2*).  For Forbes, a true utterance of (1) expresses a proposition partly
about personae (or, more strictly, modes of personification).  This proposition can be
roughly expressed with (1F).
7(1F) Superman, so-personified, leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent, so-
personified.
For Moore, a true utterance of (1) expresses a proposition about aspects of
Superman/Clark, one that can be roughly expressed with (1M).
(1M) Superman/Clark’s Superman-aspect leaps more tall buildings than
Superman/Clark’s Clark-Kent-aspect.
The key difference between these accounts is that for Moore, some utterances of
‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ occurring in utterances of (1) do not co-refer, but instead
refer to different aspects of the same individual.  For Forbes, all utterances of the names
co-refer, but some utterances of (1) express propositions that are also about modes of
personification.
Both accounts say that utterances of (1) can express different propositions in
different contexts.  On Moore’s view, this occurs because some utterances of ‘Superman’
and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to the individual, and not to aspects of him9.  On Forbes’s view,
some utterances of (1) do not express propositions about modes of personification.10
Forbes and Moore hypothesize this sort of contextual variation in order to account for
some of our intuitions.  Consider, for example, a conversation between two people who
have just learned of Superman’s double life, and who are now amazedly working out the
consequences of this revelation.  One of them utters (8).
(8) Wow, so sometimes Clark Kent wears a cape and leaps tall buildings!
This utterance of (8) seems, intuitively, to be true.  But if Moorean or Forbesian
propositions about personae or aspects were expressed by all utterances of sentences
containing ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’, then no utterance of (8) would be true.11
8Moore and Forbes adopt a common explanation of this contextual variation.  They
distinguish between two sorts of contexts, enlightened and unenlightened.  Enlightened
contexts are those in which the conversational participants are aware of the relevant
double lives, while unenlightened contexts are ones in which the conversational
participants are not aware of such facts.  In unenlightened contexts, the conversational
participants do not know that reference to aspects or modes of personification might be
called for, and so utterances of the names refer only to individuals.12  In unenlightened
contexts, then, utterances of (2) and (2*) express propositions that cannot differ in truth-
value, and an utterance of (1), like an utterance of (1*), is simply false.13  In enlightened
contexts, however, conversational participants are in a position to make reference to
aspects or modes of personification, and if their focus is on these rather than individuals,
the propositions expressed by their utterances will involve aspects or modes of
personification.  In these contexts, then, (2) and (2*) may express propositions that can
differ in truth-value, and (1) may express a true proposition.
Because they disagree about whether utterances of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ co-
refer in true utterances of (1), Forbes and Moore would reply differently to the argument
that your intuitions are incorrect (which appeared in our introduction).  Forbes would
reject the assumption that (1*) follows from (1) and (3), while Moore would hold that (3)
is false, in the context in which you thought about (1) and (1*).14
3.2.  Implicature-based Solutions
We turn now to describing solutions that (i) hold that your intuitions about simple
sentences are incorrect, and (ii) explain away your incorrect intuitions by appeal to
9implicatures.  These theories come in (at least) two flavours, neo-Russellian and neo-
Fregean.
A neo-Fregean theory, like Barber’s, holds that, in every context, (1) and (1*)
express distinct, but necessarily equivalent, propositions.15  Furthermore, identity
sentence (3) and identity sentence (3*) express distinct necessary propositions in every
context. 16
(3) Superman is identical with Clark Kent.
(3*) Superman is identical with Superman.
Neo-Fregeans have a straightforward explanation for how an unenlightened speaker can
think that (1) is true and (1*) is false, and that (2) and (2*) can differ in truth-value.
Unenlightened speakers don’t believe that Superman is Clark Kent.  That is why they fail
to substitute, and so have incorrect intuitions about (1)-(2*).  However, enlightened
speakers’ incorrect intuitions about (1)-(2*) are prima facie puzzling, for these speakers
do believe that Superman is Clark Kent, and so are in a position to make the correct
substitution inference.
This is the point at which Barber appeals to conversational implicatures.  On his
view, utterances of (1)-(2*) sometimes conversationally implicate propositions that really
do, or can, differ in truth-value.  These implicated propositions are very like the
propositions ((1F) or (1M)) that Forbes and Moore maintain are semantically expressed
by the utterances.17  When an utterance of (1) conversationally implicates a proposition
like (1F) or (1M), an enlightened speaker entertains that implicated proposition; he then
consults his relevant beliefs, and correctly judges that this proposition is false.  His
10
judgment that this implicated proposition is false causes him to (incorrectly) think that
the utterance of (1) is false.  A similar story can be told about (2) and (2*).
In the fourth paragraph of this paper, we presented an argument that your
intuitions are correct.  Barber can respond to it by pointing out that it implicitly assumes
that a rational and relevantly well-informed speaker who understands utterances of the
sentences judges that the utterances are true iff he judges that the propositions that they
semantically express are true.  This assumption is false.  Even competent, rational, and
well-informed speakers sometimes judge that an utterance is true because they judge that
the proposition it implicates is true.  Furthermore, the argument assumes that if (1)
followed from (1*) and (3), then you would perform the substitution inference.  But that
is not so, as you may be confused about what the utterance of (1) semantically expresses,
or exclusively focused on what it implicates.
Neo-Russellians can offer a similar implicature-based story.  Neo-Russellian
semantic theories say that the only contribution a name ever makes to the proposition
expressed by an utterance of a sentence containing it is its referent.  This means that all
utterances of (1) and (1*) express the same proposition, as do all utterances of (2) and
(2*), and (3) and (3*).  Anyone who believes the proposition expressed by (3), then,
believes the proposition expressed by (3*), as they express the same proposition.  So (in
contrast to neo-Fregeans) neo-Russellians cannot say that the unenlightened fail to
believe the proposition that Superman is Clark Kent—they believe this simply by virtue
of believing that Superman is Superman.  They cannot, then, explain unenlightened
speakers’ anti-substitution intuitions by appeal to this ignorance.  Instead, neo-
Russellians typically say that a single proposition can be believed under different guises
11
or via different ways of taking a proposition.  An unenlightened speaker believes the
proposition that Superman is Clark Kent under a guise corresponding to (3*), but does
not believe that proposition under a guise corresponding to (3).  Thus he may think that
(3*) is true and (3) is false, and may fail to make the relevant substitution inferences in
(1)-(2*).18  However, neo-Russellians cannot explain an enlightened speaker’s anti-
substitution intuitions in this way, for enlightened speakers believe that Superman is
Clark Kent under a guise corresponding to (3).  Thus enlightened speakers seem to be in
a position to recognize that (1) and (1*) have the same truth-value, and similarly for (2)
and (2*).
It’s at this point that the neo-Russellian theorist appeals to implicatures, in much
the way that the neo-Fregean theorist did.  The neo-Russellian says that some utterances
of (1) implicate a proposition about aspects like those expressed by (1F) or (1M).  This
implicated proposition is true.  Speakers judge that this implicated proposition is true, and
so come to believe that the utterance of (1) is itself true.19  The story about (2) and (2*) is
similar.  The neo-Russellian response to the argument that your intuitions are correct is
much the same as the neo-Fregean’s response.
3.3.  Critique of semantic and implicature solutions
The semantic and implicature accounts are similar in one respect that is important
for our critique:  both imply that an utterance of (1) semantically expresses or
conversationally implicates a proposition about personae or aspects only if the speaker is
thinking about personae or aspects.  This, we think, creates problems for both sorts of
account.
12
On Moore’s and Forbes’s theories, the proposition that (1) semantically expresses
varies from context to context.  In enlightened contexts, an utterance of (1) may
semantically express a proposition about aspects, if the conversational participants,
including the speaker, are focused on them.  (From here on, we use ‘aspects’ as short for
‘aspects or modes of personification’).  But in unenlightened contexts, an utterance of (1)
does not express a proposition about aspects; in such contexts, (1) expresses a false
proposition entirely about the individual Superman/Clark.
Implicature-based accounts have an analogous consequence.  The conversational
implicatures of an utterance depend upon the thoughts of the conversational participants.
An enlightened speaker may implicate something about aspects in uttering (1), if she is
focused on aspects when she utters (1).  But an unenlightened speaker cannot
conversationally implicate propositions about aspects.  Grice's discussion of
conversational implicature clearly supports this conclusion:
[One] who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that
q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that (1) he is
presumed to be following the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative
Principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required to
make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent
with this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the hearer to
think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to
work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required.
(Grice 1989: 31.)
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Consider condition (3).  According to it, a speaker conversationally implicates a
proposition about aspects only if the speaker thinks that the hearer can work out that the
speaker is thinking about aspects.  But if the speaker is unenlightened, and not thinking
about aspects, then surely the speaker does not think that her hearer can work out that the
speaker is thinking about aspects.  So if the speaker is unenlightened, then her utterances
of (1) do not implicate propositions about aspects.20
Thus if either a semantic or implicature account is correct, an utterance of (1)
semantically expresses or conversationally implicates a proposition about aspects only if
(a) the speaker is enlightened and (b) the speaker is thinking about aspects.  Moreover, if
either account is correct, competent speakers, like you, should know (at least tacitly) that
a speaker communicates something about aspects only if the speaker is thinking about
aspects.
We can now see that both accounts seem to make certain false predictions about
your judgments.  If either account were correct, then you would have known that the
authors of (1)-(2*) were trying to communicate something about aspects only if they
were enlightened and thinking about aspects.  So, if these accounts were correct, you
would surely have paused to consider whether the authors were thinking about aspects,
before passing judgment on the truth-values of (1)-(2*); and you would have withheld
judgment if you did not know, or were not sure, whether the authors were focused on
aspects.  But these predictions are incorrect.  You did not pause to consider the
knowledge and interests of the authors before making your judgments, and you did not
withhold judgment on the sentences.  On the contrary, you quickly and confidently made
your judgments without any consideration of such matters.21
14
A defender of a semantic or implicature account might reply that, when a typical
reader encounters (1)-(2*), he automatically and unconsciously assumes that the authors
are enlightened, and are intending to communicate something about aspects of
Superman/Clark.  This reply may have some initial plausibility when it comes to
explaining the intuitions of people who (like you) encounter these sentences in a
philosophical article whose title suggests that the authors will discuss substitution
puzzles.  Such readers might simply assume (incorrectly) that the authors intend to
communicate propositions about aspects of Superman/Clark. 22   We doubt, however, that
people who encounter these sentences outside philosophy journals make such
unconscious assumptions; these speakers’ lack of hesitation still needs to be explained.
Moreover, no such reply can be made to our next objection.
Suppose now that we tell you that sentence (1) was uttered by Lois in a
conversation with her friend Myrtle about why Superman is so much more desirable than
Lois’s dull colleague Clark.  Both of them falsely believe that Superman and Clark Kent
are distinct individuals.  If you are like most speakers, these details will not change the
intuitions that you had at the start of this paper.23  You will still judge that (1) is true.24
But neither the semantic nor the pragmatic accounts we have described can explain this
intuition of yours.  On these accounts, an unenlightened speaker’s utterance cannot
semantically express, or conversationally implicate, a proposition about aspects.  Lois is
unenlightened.  So, on these accounts, her utterance of (1) can neither semantically
express nor conversationally implicate a proposition about aspects. Without such a
proposition, said or implicated, none of these accounts can explain your intuition that (1)
is true.
15
3.4.  Some Responses and a Misinterpretation
We now wish to consider two responses to our criticisms of the semantic and
implicature accounts.  We also want to block a misinterpretation of our views that our
criticisms could inspire.
Here is the first response:  a confused advocate of a semantic or implicature
account might claim that your intuition about the Lois-Myrtle case is due to your
entertaining an aspect-proposition that Lois’s utterance neither expresses nor implicates.
But if Lois’s utterance neither semantically expresses nor conversationally implicates an
aspect-proposition, then your intuition is not explained by either semantics or
implicatures.  Therefore, this reply is inconsistent with the semantic and implicature
accounts of your intuitions.
The second response we wish to consider is more interesting.  In “Did Clinton
Lie?” (2000), Moore maintains that, in some cases, one proposition is said relative to the
audience’s context while a different proposition is said relative to the speaker’s context.
Here’s one example that Moore uses to support this theory of relativized expression of
propositions:  Jack (thinking of Clinton) exclaims “I’m shocked—the president had
improper relations!”.  Jack’s audience, Jacques, takes him to be discussing Mitterand.
Moore says that, relative to Jacques’s context, Jack said something about Mitterand,
while relative to his own context Jack said something about Clinton.  Our example
involves a mismatch between the speaker’s and audience’s degrees of enlightenment.
Moore might therefore maintain that Lois’s utterance semantically expressed a
proposition about aspects relative to the audience’s context, though not relative to hers.
16
But this hypothetical reply ignores crucial facts about our case.  The examples
Moore gives to support his view involve situations in which conversational participants
are significantly unaware of each other’s thoughts and intentions.  We can see the
importance of this ignorance by extending Moore’s example.  Suppose that a third-party
explains to Jacques that Jack was thinking of Clinton.  Jacques will no longer take Jack to
be talking about Mitterand, and it is implausible to suppose that Jack said something
about Mitterand relative to Jacques’s new context. Now in the case we presented, you
know that Lois is unenlightened.  Thus you know enough about Lois’s thoughts and
intentions to know that she is not making a claim about aspects.  Thus a hypothetical
Moorean claim that Lois said something about aspects, relative to your context, is
implausible.
Finally, we turn to a potential misinterpretation of our views.  Some readers might
take us to be claiming that (i) speakers cannot use sentences like (1)-(2*) to implicate
propositions about aspects, and (therefore) (ii) speakers’ intuitions about utterances of
(1)-(2*) can never be explained by implicatures concerning aspects or their ilk.  We are
not making these claims.  Indeed, we think that almost any sentence can be used to
implicate almost any proposition, in the right sort of context.  Thus, in certain special
contexts, utterances of these sentences can be used to implicate propositions about
aspects (or about roles, personae, and similar matters).  Suppose, for instance, that
Jonathan and Martha Kent know that their adopted son Clark leads a double life, and are
discussing his activities.  Martha might say to Jonathan, “Clark performs feats when he is
occupying his Superman-role that he would never perform when he is not occupying that
role.  For instance, Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark”.  In this context,
17
Martha’s utterance (almost certainly) implicates a proposition about roles, and Jonathan’s
intuitions about her utterance might be explained by his grasping that proposition.  But
this context obviously provides a lot of support for such an implicature.  This support is
absent from the contexts in which you had the standard anti-substitution intuitions about
(1)-(2*).  We have here argued only that implicatures concerning aspects do not explain
the intuitions that you had in those contexts (e.g., when reading the sentences at the
beginning of this paper or when considering the Lois-Myrtle example).
The semantic and implicature accounts, then, cannot explain standard initial
intuitions about (1)-(2*), and cannot explain the persistence of these intuitions in the
Lois-and-Myrtle example.  These theories do not, then, solve the puzzle that is the topic
of this paper.
4.  Our Solution
4.1.  A False Principle
The semantic and implicature accounts agree on an important point: when you
read (1) and (1*), you entertained some propositions that differ in truth-value, and when
you read (2) and (2*), you entertained some propositions that can differ in truth-value.
The semantic and implicature accounts disagree only about whether the propositions that
you entertained were semantically expressed or conversationally implicated.  Indeed,
nearly all attempts to explain competent, knowledgeable speakers’ intuitions about
utterances (whether simple or not) hypothesize that these speakers grasp propositions that
(i) are either semantically expressed or conversationally implicated by the utterances and
(ii) have the (possible) truth-values that the speakers attribute to the utterances.  Thus,
18
one can easily get the impression that nearly all theorists who write about speakers’
intuitions accept what we call The Matching Proposition Principle.
(MP) The Matching Proposition Principle
Suppose that a competent, rational, relevantly well-informed speaker hears and
understands an utterance U of a sentence, and judges U to have a (possible) truth-
value T.  Then there is some proposition P such that:
(a) U either semantically expresses P or conversationally implicates P; and
(b) P has (possible) truth-value T. 25
No one, to our knowledge, has explicitly endorsed (MP).  But the fact is that, when it
comes to explaining the truth-conditional intuitions of well-informed speakers, the
literature is filled with semantic explanations and implicature-based explanations, and not
much else.26   Thus, the literature looks as if it were written by authors who tacitly accept
(MP).  As a result, it becomes very natural for those who read the literature to think that
semantics and implicatures are the only options.  We think, however, that (MP) is false.
The Lois-and-Myrtle example in the last section (if successful) shows that it is false, for
Lois’s utterance neither semantically expresses nor conversationally implicates a
proposition that matches your intuitions in the way that (MP) specifies.
In fact, we think it is rather strange that theorists have for so long seemed to
adhere to (MP).  Consider again what we need to do, if we take certain intuitions about
(possible) truth-values to be inaccurate: we need to explain how it is that people make
wrong judgments about whether an utterance of a sentence has a certain (possible) truth-
value, (given certain facts).  Prima facie, people could go wrong in any number of ways.
To see this, it may be helpful to consider people’s errors in two experiments that have
19
been discussed by cognitive psychologists, the Wason selection task and the Moses
illusion.
The Wason selection task involves—in its broadest outline— asking people to
judge which facts they need to know in order to evaluate the truth of a conditional
statement.  Wason’s original task (Wason, 1966) presented subjects with cards that they
were told had a letter on one side and a number on the other.  They were then asked to
say which cards they would need to turn over in order to judge whether the experimenter
was speaking truthfully when he said, ‘if a card has a vowel on one side, then it has an
even number on the other side’ (Wason 1966, p. 146).  People are, in general, very bad at
this task.   They make terrible decisions as to which information they would need to
decide whether the claim in question is true or false. 27  There is an enormous literature on
this task, and there are many, many explanations of why people make the mistakes that
they do.  Some do turn on pragmatics, but others involve cheater-detection modules,
availability effects, confirmation biases, matching biases, and reasoning schemas—to
name just a few.28  The judgments called for in the Wason test are judgments about what
information is relevant to a decision regarding truth-value.  Such judgments are clearly
importantly similar to the sorts of judgments regarding (1)-(2*) that we are trying to
explain.  Nonetheless, implicature-based explanations are just one sort among many that
have been offered for the Wason reasoning error.  We think this is a striking fact.
We can best present the Moses illusion by example.29  Please try to answer the
following question.
(9) How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark?
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If you are like most readers, you answered ‘two’.  But, of course, that answer is incorrect,
for it was Noah, not Moses, who took animals into the ark (according to the Biblical
story).  What makes your answer puzzling is that you knew this fact about Noah (and
Moses).  Most people similarly tend to judge that sentence (10) is true, even though they
“know better”.
(10) Moses took two animals of each kind on the ark.
On the other hand, people tend not to make these mistakes when the name ‘Nixon’ is
substituted for ‘Moses’ in either sentence.  Experiments strongly suggest that readers
correctly understand the relevant sentences (including the name) and that they are not
misled by conversational implicatures.  If this is so, then every case in which a
knowledgeable person judges that (10) is true is a counterexample to (MP).30  Nearly all
psychologists who have studied this phenomenon agree that the correct explanation
involves the fact that most people associate similar features with the names ‘Moses’ and
‘Noah’, for instance, being a Biblical character, receiving messages from God, and
performing important deeds involving water (Moses parted the Red Sea).  According to
one explanation (Reder and Kusbit, 1991), the overlap of features associated with the two
names causes readers to make errors when they draw on their memories to answer the
(correctly understood) question or to evaluate the truth of the (correctly understood)
indicative sentence.
Our brief discussion of the Wason selection task and the Moses illusion should
remind us that our intuitions regarding truth values and possible truth values are
determined by complex psychological processes.  For instance, when you decide whether
some utterance of (1) is true or false, given a certain set of facts, you are influenced by (at
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least) which facts you take to be relevant and what you take their relevance to be; how
well you recall relevant background facts; how long and hard you think about
background facts; how well you reason about the impact these facts should have on your
judgment; and any number of biases and the like.  In principle, errors may occur at any
stage.  Thus, there is no reason to assume that an error in your judgments about (1)-(2*)
could only be due to a confusion of semantics with pragmatics.  In particular, there is no
reason to assume (as implicature and semantic theorists seem to) that you could not have
made an error in determining the truth-value (according to your beliefs) of the
(implicated or expressed) proposition that you entertained when you read (1).  In fact, we
think that this is precisely where you made an error.  Thus we think that (MP) is false.
Below, we describe how you might make such an error.
4.2.   Our Positive Account
Here is what we think the truth of the matter is, beginning with your intuitions
about (1) and (1*). The propositions that (1) and (1*) semantically express are
propositions about the individual Superman/Clark, and not propositions about aspects.
When you read (1)-(1*), you entertained these propositions and you did not entertain any
propositions about aspects.  But you made some mistakes when you evaluated these
semantically expressed propositions for truth.  For instance, according to your beliefs, the
proposition that (1) semantically expressed was false, but you came to believe it was true.
Thus you came to think that the relevant inscription of (1) was true, even though the
proposition that you entertained as a result of reading (1) was false.  Finally, you did not
consider the proposition that Superman is Clark Kent during this evaluation procedure; or
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if you did, you failed to go through the sort of reasoning that would have allowed you to
detect your mistake.  We shall call this the Basic Version of the Mistaken Evaluation
Explanation of your simple sentence intuitions, or the ‘Basic Explanation’, for short.
Our discussion of (MP), and Wason and Moses, should make it clear that the
Basic Explanation might correctly explain your intuitions, despite its inconsistency with
(MP).  The Basic Explanation, however, does not describe how or why you made a
mistake in your initial evaluation of the proposition that you entertained—it’s unlikely,
then, to be fully satisfying without a bit of supplementation.  We suspect that more
detailed explanations of the initial mistake may vary from individual to individual, and
may vary across different occasions for the same individual.  Furthermore, we think that
more detailed explanations of these mistakes can only be discovered empirically.
Nevertheless, we shall engage below in some speculations as to the reasons for your
mistaken evaluation.
We suspect that, because Superman/Clark leads a double life, you maintain two
cognitively separated sets of beliefs about him, one of which is associated with the name
‘Superman’, the other of which is associated with the name ‘Clark Kent’.  You do this
even though you know that these are names of the same individual. We shall call these
two sets of beliefs your ‘two pools of information’. These two pools of information
attribute different properties to Superman/Clark.  For instance, the ‘Superman’ pool
attributes to him the property of leaping tall buildings, while the ‘Clark’ pool does not.31
You also associate different images with the two names.  When you quickly evaluated the
proposition semantically expressed by (1), your pools of information and images
appeared to you to support that proposition’s truth.  Therefore, you judged that (1) was
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true.  You did not pause to consider the identity long enough to notice its logical
consequences.  Or, if you did, you erred in not considering this good reason to alter your
original judgment.  Let’s call this the Two Pools Version of the Mistaken Evaluation
Explanation, or the ‘Two Pools Explanation’ for short.  Notice that it is just an
elaboration on the Basic Explanation.  In section 4.8 below, we describe how both neo-
Russellians and neo-Fregeans could accept it.
Even the Two Pools Explanation is rather sketchy about how you made your
mistake.  But to provide a more detailed explanation, we must make further, even more
speculative, assumptions about your psychological processes.  We think it will be useful
to consider such speculative explanations, for two reasons.  First, the forthcoming
speculative explanations suggest that it is possible for a person with the right sort of
psychological structure (whether or not his psychological structure is exactly like yours)
to entertain the propositions that (1)-(2*) semantically express, without entertaining
propositions about aspects, and yet still make the same erroneous judgments that you did.
Second, we think that consideration of these speculative explanations makes it evident
that our Basic and Two Pools Explanations are compatible with a very wide range of
assumptions about our psychological makeups.32
4.3.   Some Cognitive Architecture
To present our most detailed and speculative explanations of your mistakes, we
must (for the moment) make some assumptions about your cognitive architecture.  Let’s
assume that humans have two sorts of mental representation: sentences in a language of
thought and images.  The former have structures similar to those of natural language
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sentences.  For convenience, we shall assume that your language of thought is English.33
Images, on the other hand, have non-linguistic structures.  They represent objects and
events in some way similar to maps or photographs or movies.
We’ll assume that a person believes a proposition if (and maybe only if) he has a
mental sentence in his head that functions in the appropriate belief-like way.  Whenever a
person has a sentence in his head that functions in the belief-like way, we will say that the
sentence is in his belief box. 34   Similarly, a person entertains a proposition if (and
perhaps only if) he has a mental sentence in his head that functions in the appropriate
entertainment-like way (different from the belief-like way).  Whenever a person has a
sentence in his head which functions in this way, we will say that he has that sentence in
his entertainment box.35  We will also assume that every subject maintains at least one
file for each person about whom that subject has beliefs.  These files are collections of
mental sentences containing one of the person’s names.36  These sentences are causally
related to each other in a particularly intimate way.  For instance, if a person consults a
file, then the sentences in it become more “active”, though some may become more
active than others.  Consequently, it becomes easier for those sentences to enter that
person’s entertainment box; moreover, the more active sentences become easier to
entertain than the less active ones.
We all know about Superman’s double life. 37  Thus all of us have the sentence
‘Superman is Clark’ somewhere in our belief boxes.  Nevertheless, Superman/Clark’s
double life gives us good reason to maintain two distinct files on him, one containing
‘Superman’ sentences and one containing ‘Clark’ sentences. 38  Files of the former sort
contain sentences like ‘Superman wears a red cape’ and ‘Superman fights for truth,
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justice, and the American way’.  Files of the latter sort contain ‘Clark Kent wears glasses’
and ‘Clark Kent works for the Daily Planet’.  A given person’s ‘Superman’ file may
attribute properties to Superman/Clark that her ‘Clark’ file fails to attribute, e.g., her
‘Superman’ file may contain ‘Superman flies’ while her ‘Clark’ file may not contain
‘Clark flies’.  A typical speaker may routinely make additions and subtractions to one file
without making the corresponding additions and subtractions to the other.  For instance,
if she reads ‘Superman saved a person who fell off a cliff’ in a reliable newspaper, she
deposits this sentence in her ‘Superman’ file, but not her ‘Clark’ file.  Moreover, she does
not (typically) add the corresponding ‘Clark’ sentence to her ‘Clark’ file.39
In short, we do not ordinarily perform all of the substitution inferences that are
allowed by the sentences in our belief boxes.  This failure to perform substitution
inferences, and this kind of segregation of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ sentences, makes
cognitive sense.  It takes cognitive effort, and other cognitive resources, to duplicate
information from one file to the other (by making substitution inferences), yet because
Superman/Clark leads a double life, this duplication often serves no useful purpose.
Thus, we often treat ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ sentences as if they were about different
people.
We also associate different images, and imaging routines, with the names
‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’.  If asked ‘Does Superman wear red boots?’, we form an image
of a man wearing a cape, not an image of a man in glasses and a business suit.  When we
read in a newspaper the sentence ‘Superman saved a person who fell off a cliff’, we
generate an image of a man with a red cape, flying and catching a person in mid-air, and
not an image of a man in glasses catching a person.  One reason that it’s reasonable for us
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to associate different sorts of image with the two names is that the two sorts of image
differ in their accuracy conditions.  For example, the former image is accurate only if a
man, while wearing a red cape, caught a person in mid-air.  This image is likely to be
accurate.  The second image is accurate only if a man, while wearing glasses and a
business suit, caught a person.  It is likely to be inaccurate.40   If we were just as likely to
form a ‘glasses’ image as a ‘caped’ image when we heard a ‘Superman’ sentence, many
more of our images would be inaccurate.
4.4.  Story One
Using these assumptions, we can construct one reasonable explanation (others
will follow) of how you came to believe that (1) is true and (1*) is false.
(1) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.
(1*) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman.
When you read (1), you entertained the proposition that it semantically expresses, by
having sentence (1) in your entertainment box.  This is a proposition about individuals
and not about aspects.  You then tried to evaluate that proposition for truth.  Prior to
reading these sentences, you had a sentence like ‘Superman leaps tall buildings in a
single bound’ in your ‘Superman’ file.  You had no such sentence in your ‘Clark’ file.  In
fact, in your ‘Clark’ file you had sentences such as ‘Clark is a mild-mannered reporter’,
which strongly suggest that Clark doesn’t leap any tall buildings.  Thus, when you turned
to your ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ files in order to evaluate the proposition expressed by
(1), you found sentences in those files that seemed to support its truth.  You didn’t stop to
consider the identity sentence ‘Superman is Clark’, or its logical consequences, even
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though you had it in your belief box.  You failed to do this simply because you (quite
reasonably) don’t usually do so when you entertain sentences containing ‘Superman’ or
‘Clark’.  So you concluded that (1) is true.
When you read (1*), you entertained the proposition that (1*) semantically
expresses, by having (1*) in your entertainment box.  You thought that (1*) could not be
true (perhaps because of its form), so you judged it to be false. Thus you came to believe
that (1) is true and (1*) is false.
If you had entertained (3), and considered its logical relations with (1) and (1*),
you might have realized that you made a mistake.  But, for the reasons discussed above,
you didn’t.  Thus you did not perform the inferences that would allow you to realize that
if (1*) is false then (1) must be false also.  That is perhaps why you initially judged that
(1) is true and (1*) is false, despite the fact that you believed (in a suitable way) that
Superman is Clark.
To determine whether it’s possible for (2) and (2*) to differ in truth-value, you
might have placed those sentences in your entertainment box, and tried to determine
whether the one can be (syntactically) derived from the other, together with various truths
in your belief box.  Or you might have entertained (2) and the negation of (2*), to see
whether there is any inconsistency between them and sentences in your belief box. If you
did this rather hastily, without considering the identity, you might not have realized that
there was an inconsistency.
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4.5.  Story Two
An alternative psychological explanation might appeal more heavily to your
imaging processes.  When you entertained (1), you generated an image of a caped man
leaping a tall building and an image of a bespectacled man leaping a tall building.  These
are images that you might form when you entertain ‘Superman leaps tall buildings’ and
‘Clark Kent leaps tall buildings’.  You came to believe that the cape-image accurately
represents some events that actually occurred, whereas the glasses-image does not.  This
led you to think that ‘Superman leaps tall buildings’ is true, whereas ‘Clark Kent leaps
tall buildings’ is false, which led you to judge that (1) is true.  Again, you did not
consider the fact that Superman is Clark, which might have given you pause.
An imagistic explanation seems particularly appealing when it comes to
explaining your intuitions about (2) and (2*).
(2) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and then Superman came out.
(2*) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and then Clark Kent came out.
When you considered whether (2) could be true while (2*) is false, you tried to form an
image of an event that is accurately described by (2) and also an image of an event
accurately described by (2*).  Considering (2), you formed an image of a bespectacled
man going into a phone booth and a caped man emerging.  Considering (2*), you formed
an image of a bespectacled man going into a phone booth and a bespectacled man
emerging.   Clearly, there can be a sequence of events that is accurately represented by
the first image, but not accurately represented by the second.  Thus you might have
concluded that it’s possible for (2) to be true and (2*) to be false.
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4.6.  Entertaining the Identity
The above explanations assume that you did not entertain the proposition that
Superman is Clark Kent (by having (3) in your entertainment box) as you tried to judge
the truth-values of (1) and (1*) and possible differences in truth-value of (2) and (2*).
But we think it’s also possible that you entertained (3) and nevertheless judged that (1) is
true and (1*) is false, and that (2) and (2*) could differ in truth-value.  For you might
have gone through one of the evaluation procedures we described above, and thus come
to be confident that (1) is true and (1*) is false.  You may then (or at the same time) have
come to entertain (3).  But you may not have considered the consequences of combining
(1) and (1*) with the identity, simply because you were already confident of your answer.
Similar points could hold for (2) and (2*).
We do not think that this would have been irrational on your part.  We simply
cannot take the time to draw out many of the logical consequences of the propositions we
believe and entertain before judging whether an English sentence is true.  Since in most
other cases you quite reasonably do not make the identity substitutions, you quite
reasonably failed to do so in this case.
We have now presented several rather detailed, but speculative, possible
explanations of your intuitions about (1)-(2*).  We shall call these our Speculative
Explanations.  Notice that all of them are consistent with, and are elaborations on, our
Basic Explanation and Two Pools Explanation.
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4.7.  Our Speculative Explanations, Neo-Russellianism, and Neo-Fregeanism
Our Speculative Explanations were couched in terms of mental sentences and
images.  We made very few assumptions about the propositions that people believe and
entertain.  For example, when we supposed that you had (1) and (1*) in your
entertainment box, we assumed that these sentences expressed propositions about the
individual Superman/Clark (and not aspects), but we made no assumptions about whether
you were thereby entertaining two distinct propositions or a single proposition “twice
over”.  Similarly, we made no assumption about whether a person who has ‘Superman is
identical with Superman’ in his belief box believes the same proposition as someone who
has ‘Superman is identical with Clark’ in his belief box.
Neo-Russellians, like ourselves, hold that (1) and (1*) semantically express the
same proposition; similarly for ‘Superman is Superman’ and ‘Superman is Clark Kent’.
Neo-Russellians can say that a person who has both in her entertainment box is
entertaining the same proposition in two different ways.  Similarly, a person who has (1*)
and the negation of (1) in her belief box thereby believes a proposition and its negation,
but does so in different ways.   Neo-Fregeans, however, hold that (1) and (1*) express
distinct propositions, as do the identity sentences.  They could maintain that someone
who has both (1) and (1*) in her belief box (or entertainment box) thereby believes
(entertains) two distinct propositions.41  Thus both neo-Russellians and neo-Fregeans can
accept our Speculative Explanations.
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4.8.  Getting Along with Weaker Psychological Assumptions
Our Speculative Explanations relied on a rather crude mental sentence theory of
belief and entertainment, and a crude theory of images.  You may have doubts about
these theories (as do we, to varying degrees and for varying reasons).  But this does not
mean that you should reject our Basic Explanation, or even our Two Pools Explanation,
for neither depends on psychological assumptions as strong as those of the Speculative
Explanations.  Below we re-present our Two Pools Explanation in slightly more detail
than we did before.  Most importantly, we show that both neo-Russellians and neo-
Fregeans can accept the Two Pools Explanation.
A neo-Russellian who does not want to make detailed commitments about
cognitive processing could say something like the following.  (1) and (1*) semantically
express the same proposition (in all contexts).  You understood (1) and (1*), and
entertained the single proposition that they express, but you did so “twice over”:  that is,
you entertained that single proposition in two distinct ways.  You tried to judge whether
that proposition is true, taken in two distinct ways.  You held various beliefs about
Superman/Clark in various ways, and these contributed to your judging that certain
propositions, entertained in certain ways, were true or false.  For instance, you may have
believed, in a ‘Superman’ way (but not a ‘Clark’ way) that Superman sometimes jumps
tall buildings.  You may have believed, in a ‘Clark’ way (but not a ‘Superman’ way) that
Clark is a mild-mannered reporter.  Together, these led you to believe the proposition
expressed by (1), in a ‘Superman/Clark’ way.  You also believed the proposition that
Superman is Clark Kent “twice over”, in a ‘Superman/Superman’ way and a
‘Superman/Clark’ way.  But, as usual, you (quite reasonably) did not entertain the
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identity proposition at all (in any way); or if you did entertain it in the right way, you
failed to make the correct inferences in the right ways.  A similar story can be told about
(2) and (2*).
A neo-Fregean can give a parallel story, but need not mention ways of believing.
On the neo-Fregean view, (1) and (1*) semantically express different propositions.  You
understood (1) and (1*), and entertained the propositions that they semantically express.
You believed various Superman-propositions, and various Clark-propositions; for
instance, you believed that Superman sometimes jumps tall buildings and that Clark is a
mild-mannered reporter.  Your beliefs led you to make some initial mistakes in
evaluating the proposition semantically expressed by (1).  Furthermore, you either failed
to entertain the proposition that Superman is Clark, or if you did entertain it, you failed to
draw the logical consequences of that proposition together with (1) and (1*).  Either way,
you did not correct your initial mistake.
Neo-Russellians and neo-Fregeans can respond similarly to the argument in the
fourth paragraph of our introduction that concludes that your intuitions were correct.
This argument implicitly assumes that you correctly evaluated the propositions
semantically expressed by the sentences, according to your beliefs.  It wrongly assumes
that you made no mistake in evaluation, and that you considered the relevant identity and
would have used it to rectify any initial mistakes.
We hope that it is clear that our Basic Explanation and Two Pools Explanation do
not rely on claims about mental sentences, files, belief boxes, and imaging routines.  Our
Basic Explanation assumes only that you entertained the propositions semantically
expressed by (1)-(2*), which are propositions entirely about an individual, and that you
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made mistakes in evaluating them.  Our more detailed Two Pools Explanation assumes
that—even when you know the truth about a double life—you sometimes segregate your
information about a single individual into distinct “pools”; because you do this, and
because you do not regularly draw out all of the logical consequences of propositions that
you believe, you sometimes give inaccurate verdicts about the truth-values (and possible
differences in truth-value) of utterances of sentences concerning individuals with double
lives.  We therefore think that any reasonable theory of cognitive processes will give us
all that we need to tell our Two Pools story, or at least our Basic story, about why your
intuitions are mistaken.
In the rest of this section, we (i) consider subjects whose anti-substitution
intuitions are particularly stubborn, and (ii) consider an objection to our explanations.
4.9.  Stubborn Ordinary Speakers
We suspect that most ordinary speakers will eventually decide that (1) and (1*)
are both false, if they are coached and led step-by-step through some reasoning that
shows that they are.  Similarly, they will eventually decide that (2) and (2*) cannot differ
in truth-value, after coaching.  This is obviously compatible with our explanations of the
initial judgments.  In fact, we take it to fit rather nicely with our hypothesis that the initial
judgments are partly due to failures to make certain inferences.  The speakers’
understanding of the sentences does not change as they go through the coaching and
reasoning.  Rather, they just think more carefully about the implications of (1), (1*), and
(3).42
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Some ordinary speakers, however, might refuse to alter their initial judgments.
They might persist in thinking that (1) is true and (1*) is false.  They might try to justify
their persisting judgments by appeal to something like aspects.  They might say that
Superman, when dressed in a cape, does leap more tall buildings than Clark, when
dressed in a business suit, or claim that Superman, when playing Superman, does leap
more tall buildings than Clark, when playing Clark (or when disguised as Clark).  They
might even say that they meant something like this when they said that (1) is true and
(1*) is false.
Do such stubborn ordinary speakers lend any support to the semantic or
implicature explanations?  We think not.  These stubborn ordinary speakers claim that
they “meant” something about aspects when they uttered ‘(1) is true and (1*) is false’.  So
they are making claims about their own utterances.  Thus even if their claims are correct,
they do not show that the inscriptions of (1) and (1*) that they read semantically
expressed or conversationally implicated propositions about aspects.  Furthermore, such
after-the-fact claims about what one “meant” by past utterances are often unreliable (as
are many after-the-fact judgments about one’s states of mind).  So, we should not take for
granted that these speakers’ claims about their utterances are correct.
4.10.  Stubborn Sophisticated Theorizers
Sophisticated theorists can make initial mistakes in evaluation very similar to
those of ordinary speakers.  Suppose that we ask a world-class logician (call her ‘Jo
Forbs’, or ‘JF’ for short) whether sentences (1) and (1*) differ in truth-value.  She may
initially execute the same procedures for answering the question that an ordinary speaker
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would.  She might consult her ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ files, and/or form images, and
come to conclude that (1) is true and (1*) is false.   She may do this before actively
entertaining the identity.  On our account, her intuitions are incorrect, but reasonable.
Suppose, now, that we remind JF that ‘Superman is Clark Kent’ is true; suppose
that she then starts actively entertaining the identity.  Still, she might not draw the correct
conclusion that (1) is false (just like (1*)).  For JF has already rather confidently judged
that (1) is true, and may be under the impression that she previously considered all
relevant facts, such as the identity, when she formed this judgment.  Moreover, JF, being
a logician, is well aware that English does not always work in the way that formal
languages do.  JF knows, for instance, that the sentences of English are ambiguous and
context-sensitive, and so she may conclude that (1) and (1*) are ambiguous or context-
sensitive.  So she may conclude that, in some contexts, (3) is false (as does Moore), or
that, in some contexts, (1*) and (3) are true, while (1) is false (as does Forbes).  Thus JF
might mistakenly be led to propose an unusual semantic theory for these sentences, and
for (2) and (2*), as well.
4.11.  An Objection and a Reply
We have argued that your reasonable tendency to maintain separate pools of
information about those with ‘double lives’ means that you don’t automatically make all
the substitution inferences that you could, and that you may sometimes be very reluctant
to do so, even upon careful consideration.  But this theory might seem to predict that you
would initially resist substitution in all simple sentences that mention people or objects
with ‘double lives’.  And this might seem to be an implausible prediction.  After all, there
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is a vast literature in the philosophy of language that assumes that substitution inferences
are obviously acceptable in sentences like (11) and (11*).
(11) Hesperus appears in the evening.
(11*) Phosphorus appears in the evening.
This literature takes for granted that substitution fails (if it does) only in attitudinal and
quotational contexts.  The reason, perhaps, is that simple sentences that provoke anti-
substitution intuitions are hard to come by.  So, if our explanations predict that all simple
sentences provoke anti-substitution intuitions, then (one might conclude) our
explanations are incorrect.
Our explanations do not, however, predict that all substitution inferences will be
difficult.  First, the Basic Explanation says only that you made a mistake when you
evaluated (1)-(2*).  It does not commit itself to any details about how you made that
mistake, and so makes no real predictions about other simple sentences.  It’s compatible
with the Basic Explanation that you find other substitution inferences easy and obvious.
Next, the Two Pools and Speculative Explanations are not meant to describe every
element of what takes place when you consider simple sentences mentioning those with
double lives.  Thus all of our explanations may be consistent with more elaborate theories
that also explain why some substitution inferences are difficult and some are easy.  We’ll
offer some suggestions for these shortly.
We also want to note that the data invoked in this objection may not be quite so
robust as they appear.  In most philosophical discussions, audiences are asked to consider
the relevant predicative sentences (e.g., (11) and (11*)) either immediately before or
immediately after they consider the relevant identity sentence (‘Hesperus is
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Phosphorus’).   We suspect that this plays an important role in producing standard
intuitions.  In addition, we think that ordinary speakers, unaccustomed to the distinction
between intensional and non-intensional contexts, and unaccustomed to discussions of
substitution puzzles, are often more reluctant to make the standard substitutions than
philosophers.  (Some readers may be able to recall teaching experiences that support this
claim.)
We do think, however, that there are clear differences in the reactions provoked
by sentences like (1) and (1*) and sentences like (11) and (11*).  We also think we can
offer some explanation of this.  There is an obvious difference in overt syntax between
our examples and more standard philosophical examples:  each of our sample sentences
contains two name occurrences, whereas the more usual philosophical sentences contain
only one name occurrence.  In particular, sentences (1) and (2) contain occurrences of
two different names.  We strongly suspect that this feature of our examples is crucial to
explaining why they provoke stronger anti-substitution intuitions than do (11) and
(11*).43  We’re not sure exactly why this feature causes readers to have such strong
intuitions.  We suspect, however, that the occurrence of two different names in a single
sentence creates an unconscious, overridable presumption that the names do not co-refer.
Why should this be?  One reason might be that speakers who thought that they were
discussing just one individual could easily utter a different sentence that made this clear.
For instance, instead of uttering (2), a speaker might utter (2a) or (2b).
(2) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and then Superman came out.
(2a) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and then he came out.
(2b) Clark Kent went into a phone booth, and then came out.
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Consequently, when you read a sentence like (2), you are led to form an especially strong
(unconscious) presumption of non-coreference.  This increases your reluctance to fully
consider all the logical consequences of the identity sentence ‘Superman is Clark Kent’
when considering the truth-values of sentences like (2).44  We think that this account
might be fleshed out by invoking resources from either Levinson’s work on pragmatics
and anaphora, or Discourse Representation Theory, but we won’t attempt to do this
here.45  In any case, our Basic, Two Pools, and Speculative Explanations could be
consistently supplemented with such accounts.  The resulting explanations would still
attribute mistaken evaluations to typical speakers.
Obviously, we have not provided a complete account of why (1)-(2*) provoke
stronger anti-substitution intuitions than most simple sentences.  But it is important to
note that our competitors are in the same position that we are.  Forbes and Moore have
postulated a potential for contextual variation in what is said by all simple sentences.
They need to explain why this potential hasn’t been noticed before, and, in particular,
why the assertion that (11) and (11*) have the same truth-value has gone unquestioned
for so long.  Barber, similarly, needs to explain why the substitution-blocking
implicatures which arise with sentences like (1)-(2*) do not arise with most other simple
sentences.  Clearly, then, the problem we’ve discussed here is not peculiar to our view.
5.  Belief Sentences
We shall not argue that our explanation of substitution-resistance in simple
sentences should be extended to belief sentences.  Indeed, the explanation of substitution-
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resistance in belief sentences that we favor (Braun 1998) is importantly different from
our explanation of simple-sentence intuitions. 46  However, we think that the arguments of
this paper are relevant to belief sentences in two ways:  (i) they cast doubt on certain
arguments for and against neo-Russellian theories of belief sentences, and (ii) they
suggest a new line of inquiry regarding belief sentences.
Consider the following argument against neo-Russellian theories of belief
sentences:  All anti-substitution intuitions of linguistically competent, rational, reflective
speakers are correct, and must be explained by semantics.  Therefore, such speakers’ anti-
substitution intuitions about belief sentences are correct and must explained by semantics.
Therefore, neo-Russellian theories of belief sentences are incorrect.  We suspect that,
before reading this paper, some philosophers would have found this argument rather
plausible.  But we have given reasons to think that anti-substitution intuitions about
certain simple sentences cannot be correctly explained by semantics.  Therefore, we have
provided reasons to think that the first premise of this argument is false.
Consider the following argument for the neo-Russellian theories of Salmon and
Soames.47  The intuitions about (1)-(2*) are not correctly explained by semantics.  If this
is so, then they are correctly explained by implicatures.  But if they are correctly
explained by implicatures, then (it’s likely that) belief-sentence intuitions are also
correctly explained by implicatures.   Thus, (it’s likely that) Salmon and Soames’s neo-
Russellian theory of belief sentences is correct.  Our discussion here gives us reason to
reject this pro-Salmon-and-Soames argument.  Although we have argued that the simple-
sentence intuitions are not correctly explained by semantics, we have also argued that
they are not correctly explained by implicatures, either.   Therefore, we have given
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reasons to think that the second premise of this pro-Salmon-and-Soames argument is
false.
Thus, our discussion here provides us with reasons to reject both the above
argument against neo-Russellian theories of belief sentences, and the above argument for
Salmon and Soames’s implicature-based explanation of anti-substitution intuitions about
belief sentences.
We think that our discussion of simple sentences suggests a new avenue of
inquiry regarding belief sentences.  Very few theorists have proposed theories of belief
sentences that conflict with (MP). 48  Most theorists have tried to explain anti-substitution
intuitions about belief sentences by appealing to some proposition, either semantically
expressed or conversationally implicated, that matches typical intuitions.  These theorists
have adhered to (MP), when it comes to explaining belief-sentence intuitions.  In our
opinion, they have failed to find such intuition-matching propositions (for some
criticisms of these theories, see Saul 1992, 1998, 1999a, 1999b).  But we have argued that
(MP) is false, on grounds independent of belief sentences.  Hence, our discussion of
simple sentences gives us reason to think that no theory of belief sentences should be
rejected simply because it is inconsistent with (MP). 49  Therefore, given the problems
with theories that are consistent with (MP), we think that theorists should consider
exploring theories of belief sentences that are inconsistent with (MP).  We suspect that
the correct explanation of belief-sentence intuitions may well be significantly unlike our
explanation of simple-sentence intuitions.  Nevertheless, we conjecture that the two
explanations will be alike in one important respect, namely, in being inconsistent with
(MP). 50
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Endnotes
                                                
1 The authors contributed equally to the writing of this paper.  Their names appear in
alphabetical order.
2 When we describe the standard intuitions about these sentences, we are speaking of
intuitions about whether the sentences are true in the Superman fiction.  We think that
this complication makes no substantive differences to what follows.  In any case, as Saul
(1997) points out, there are pairs of sentences entirely about real things that provoke the
same intuitions and raise similar issues, for instance (i)-(ii):
(i) Andropov often visited Leningrad, but never visited St. Petersburg.
(ii) Andropov often visited Leningrad, but never visited Leningrad.
3 You may be a particularly wary philosopher, who always thinks long and hard before
making any judgments about sentences that appear in philosophy journals (lest you be
caught in some intellectual trap).  If you are, then you may have paused, thought hard,
and then judged that (1) and (1*) are both false, and that (2) and (2*) cannot differ in
truth-value.  The fact that you had these (somewhat unusual) initial intuitions, if you did,
is compatible with our solution to the puzzle that we are about to describe. (It’s also
compatible with all other proposed solutions to the puzzle.)
4 We assume that ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ are rigid designators.
5 Some of the sentences in Saul (1997), as Forbes (1997) and Moore (1999) have noted,
arguably involve covert reference to psychological attitudes.  For the purposes of this
paper, we focus on sentences like (1)-(5*), which clearly don't.
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6  In a recent paper, David Pitt (2001) has presented a semantic solution to the puzzle that
differs in significant respects from those of Forbes and Moore (see note 11 for a
description of one important difference).  Because of limitations of space, we are unable
to discuss his view in detail.  We hope to do so in future work.
7 At least, we don't accept the most common sort of pragmatic explanation. The term
‘pragmatic’ gets used in many ways, and there are probably meanings of the term on
which our explanation counts as pragmatic.
8 More precisely (here we go a bit beyond what Forbes and Moore explicitly say): on
their views, some utterances of (1), and some acts of inscribing (1), in some contexts,
semantically express true propositions; similarly, some utterances of, and acts of
inscribing, sentences (2) and (2*) semantically express propositions that really can differ
in truth-value.  When a person reads printed tokens of (1)-(2*), she may take them as
evidence that the author(s) of the tokens engaged in some act of inscribing in some
context.  In what follows, we often ignore these details (as do Forbes and Moore
themselves).  Sometimes we’ll speak as though Forbes’s and Moore’s views entail that
readers read certain inscriptions, and that these inscriptions expressed certain
propositions.  (If ‘inscription’ here means something like token, then remarks of this sort
are, strictly speaking, incorrect; and if ‘inscription’ means act of inscribing, then, strictly
speaking, readers rarely read inscriptions.)  See Perry 1997 for more on tokens vs.
utterances.  See note 22 for further complications.
9 Also, utterances of these names may refer to different aspects on different occasions.
10 Which modes of presentation are involved in the propositions expressed by utterances
of (1) may also vary.
47
                                                                                                                                                
11  Pitt’s (2001) theory says that all utterances of ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ refer to
distinct alter egos of   a single person (Kal El).  Thus his theory entails that all utterances
of (8) are false.  His view similarly entails that all utterances of the identity sentence (3)
semantically express a false proposition.  We think that these consequences of Pitt’s view
are incorrect (as are other consequences), but limitations of space prevent us from saying
more here.
12  Forbes and Moore do not mention it, but their views allow that a speaker who is
unenlightened about the Superman/Clark double life could use ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark’ to
speak about aspects or personae of the individual Superman/Clark.  For instance, though
Lois believes that Superman is not Clark, she may still wish to speak of two aspects of
Clark Kent, the diffident bumbling klutz and the aggressive muckraking reporter, and she
may sometimes use ‘Clark’ to refer to one or the other of these aspects.  (In this case,
Lois would be enlightened about the bumbling klutz/muckraking reporter double life, and
so enlightened about the double life relevant to her utterances.) We will ignore this
possibility from here on.
13 The reason that unenlightened speakers can (nevertheless) think that (1) is true and (1*)
is false, and that (2) and (2*) can differ in truth-value, is that they don’t believe the
proposition that (the individual) Superman is (the individual) Clark Kent.
14 Here are some details.  A crucial premise in the argument of the third paragraph of our
introduction is the claim that (1*) follows from (1) and (3).  Let’s take this to be the claim
that the following argument is valid:
(1) Superman leaps more tall buildings than Clark Kent.
(3) Superman is identical with Clark Kent.
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(1*) Therefore, Superman leaps more tall buildings than Superman.
Forbes and Moore hold that (1) and (1*) are context-sensitive.  Thus, to assess the claim
that this argument is valid, they must use a notion of validity that applies to arguments
containing context-sensitive sentences.  The best such notion is David Kaplan’s (1989)
(some remarks by Forbes (1999, p. 88) suggest that he would agree).  On Kaplan’s
theory, an argument is valid iff for every context in every model, if the premises are true
in that context in that model, then so is the conclusion.  (Alternatively:  if the premises
express propositions in that context that are true in that context, then so does the
conclusion.)  Given this definition of validity, Moore can say that the argument is valid:
in every context in which (3) is true, the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark Kent’ refer in that
context to the same thing (either an ordinary individual or an aspect).  In such contexts,
the occurrences of the names in (1) and (1*) also refer to the same thing, and so if the
premises are true in the context, then the conclusion is also true in the context.  However,
Moore can say that the context in which you read inscriptions of (1) and (1*) is one in
which the names referred to distinct aspects.  Thus, (3) was false in the context.  (In most
contexts in which (3) is uttered, it is true.  But (3) was not uttered in this context.)  Moore
could say that the reasoning of the third paragraph of our introduction went wrong when
it (implicitly) assumed that (3) is true in every context, including the context in which
you read (1) and (1*).  Matters are more complicated for Forbes.  According to him,
sentences (1) and (1*) are ambiguous.  One reading of (1) can be represented by a
“logical form” that contains the expression ‘so-personified’ (or something similar), as
does our (1F).  But there is another reading of (1) that is properly represented by a logical
form which does not contain ‘so-personified’.  (1*) is similarly ambiguous.   The logical
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forms in which ‘so-personified’ appears are context-sensitive, for the reference of ‘so’
depends on context.  Now consider a disambiguation of the above argument in which
both (1) and (1*) are correctly represented by logical forms that include the phrase ‘so-
personified’.  There are contexts in which (3) and the ‘so-personified’ reading of (1) are
true, but in which the ‘so-personified’ reading of (1*) is false.   Thus this disambiguated
argument is invalid.  (On another disambiguation, the argument is valid.) Forbes could
say that the reasoning of the third paragraph of our introduction went wrong in two ways:
it (implicitly) assumed that the sentences of the argument are unambiguous, and it
(implicitly) assumed that they are not context-sensitive.   (Thanks to Forbes and Moore
for discussion of these matters.)
15 By contrast, Forbes and Moore say that there are contexts (namely, some enlightened
contexts) in which  (1) and (1*) express distinct propositions that are not necessarily
equivalent.
16   We are assuming that standard neo-Fregean theories entail that ‘Superman’ and
‘Clark Kent’ are rigid designators, for otherwise they would be vulnerable to standard
Kripkean modal objections.
17 Barber (2000) says that the implicated propositions concern the individual
Superman/Clark and the attribute Supermanizing or the attribute Clark Kentizing.  We
assume here that these attributes are roughly the same as those of occupying the
Superman persona and occupying the Clark Kent persona, and so Barber’s implicated
propositions are very like Forbes’s and Moore’s semantically expressed propositions.
(There are in fact differences, but none that are relevant to this discussion.)
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18 For more on this sort of story, see Salmon 1986, 1989, and Braun 1998, 2002.  In our
view, all neo-Russellians need to make use of ways of taking propositions; see Braun
2002.
19 On the neo-Russellian theory, an implicated proposition can be entertained and
believed in a variety of ways (or under a variety of guises).  The hearer will conclude that
(1) is true only if she entertains, and believes, the implicated proposition in the right way.
See Braun 1998 and 2002.
20  Grice’s characterisation arguably also implies that an utterance of (1) implicates a
proposition about aspects only if the audience is enlightened, due to condition (2). But
this isn’t relevant to our concerns here.  For more on the consequences of condition (2),
see Saul 2001, 2002.
21 A closely related problem for implicature accounts is that the alleged implicatures
cannot be either generalized (arising as a default due to certain words, phrases, or
constructions) or particularized (depending very strongly on context, rather than arising
as a default).  Your context did not contain any prior discussion of Superman/Clark’s
double-life; moreover, you had not been given any information about whether the
relevant speaker was thinking about aspects.  Thus your intuitions occurred in a context
in which there was no contextual support for a particularized implicature concerning
aspects.  Therefore, a theorist who wishes to explain your intuitions by appeal to
implicatures must maintain that the relevant implicatures are generalized.  This theorist
would then have to say that there are some words, phrases, or constructions that give rise
to such implicatures, even in the absence of contextual information.  It seems that the
only candidates for creating such implicatures are the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark
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Kent’ themselves; so the theorist must claim that utterances of sentences containing these
names give rise to implicatures concerning aspects, even in the absence of contextual
information.  But, as we pointed out in the main text, Grice’s theory entails that
unenlightened speakers’ utterances of sentences containing these names do not implicate
propositions about aspects.  So it seems that the alleged implicatures concerning aspects
cannot be generalized.  Some implicature-theorists might want to reject this last aspect of
Grice’s theory, and maintain that utterances by unenlightened speakers do implicate
aspect-propositions.  But this reply is problematic.  The unenlightened speakers that we
are considering (e.g., Lois) understand sentences containing these names, and are
otherwise perfectly competent with them.  And yet they would never entertain the alleged
implicatures when they utter or hear the relevant sentences.  In fact, they would be unable
to calculate these implicatures.  So the reply implies that there are generalized
conversational implicatures that some competent speakers cannot calculate and never
entertain.  This is surely incorrect.
22 We think there are some tricky issues about how sentences like these are supposed to
be understood when they are presented in the manner that they are in this paper.
Arguably, the authors are merely mentioning, rather than using, the sentences, and you
are meant to evaluate them with respect to some conversation in which they are used
rather than mentioned.  See also note 8.
23 Moore (1999, pp. 93-4) considers a similar case, but reports that his intuitions are
different from those that we predict.  We suspect that the judgments that he is reporting
are not his initial (“snap”) judgments, and may be influenced by his theory.
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24 We are here assuming that you had the standard intuitions when you first encountered
the sentences.  If you didn’t, then you probably did not have the intuition that we
predicted you would have about the Lois-Myrtle case.  Nevertheless, we believe that
many competent, rational, reflective, well-informed readers will have the predicted
intuition about Lois’s utterance.  This is enough to generate the problem for the semantic
and implicature accounts that we describe in the main text.
25 Two remarks about (MP):  (i) (MP) concerns speakers who judge that U has a possible
truth-value T.  This is shorthand for talk about speakers who judge that certain sentences
could be true (or could be false).  We have in mind, for example, speakers who judge that
a particular utterance of the conjunction of (2) and the negation of (2*) could be true.  (ii)
(MP) concerns speakers who are relevantly well-informed.  It’s difficult to say in a
completely general way what this amounts to.  But for many of the cases we discuss here,
a speaker counts as relevantly well-informed only if she believes certain identities (in the
right ways).  For example, in cases in which the speaker is making judgments about the
truth-values, or possible differences in truth-value, among (1)-(2*), the speaker must
believe that Superman is Clark Kent (in a ‘Superman’-‘Clark’ way).  Similarly for cases
in which the speaker is making judgments about belief sentences, such as ‘Lois believes
that Superman can fly’ and ‘Lois believes that Clark can fly’.
26 Some qualifications regarding some neo-Russellians:  (i) As we noted in section 3.3,
some neo-Russellians, including Salmon and Soames, provide non-semantic, non-
implicature explanations of speakers’ intuitions about some simple sentences.  For
instance, Salmon and Soames say that a speaker who accepts ‘Superman is Superman’
but rejects ‘Superman is Clark’ does so because she believes the proposition that
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Superman is Superman under one guise, but believes its negation under another, suitably
different guise.  (Recall, however, that an appeal to guises is not sufficient to explain
speakers’ intuitions about (1)-(2*).)  (ii) Despite this, many neo-Russellians, including
Salmon and Soames, turn to implicatures (or something like them) to explain speakers’
intuitions about belief sentences.  Soames (1995) is explicit about this.  Salmon (1989)
points to the usefulness of Gricean distinctions, but shies away from endorsing the
mechanism of implicature.  Still, he does not suggest another mechanism.  (iii) Thus,
some neo-Russellians, including Salmon and Soames, implicitly reject the fully general
version of (MP) given in the text, but seem to (tacitly) accept a version of (MP) that is
restricted to belief sentences.  We suspect that even this restricted version of (MP) is
false.  See section 5.
27 There are, however, certain logically equivalent tasks on which people perform very
well.
28 For a good overview of approaches to the Wason selection task, see Evans, Newstead,
and Byrne 1993.
29 The Moses illusion was first studied (and named) in Erickson and Mattson 1981.
Subsequent studies include Reder and Kusbit 1991, Kamas, et al. 1996, and Hannon and
Daneman 2001.
30 In this type of case, a speaker satisfies (MP)’s requirement of being relevantly well-
informed only if she believes (in the right way) that Noah took two animals of each type
on to the ark and believes (in the right way) that Moses did not.
31 A neo-Fregean could say that you believe that Superman leaps tall buildings, but you
don’t believe that Clark does, although the propositions you believe (including the
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proposition that Superman is Clark) logically imply that Clark leaps tall buildings.  See
below for more details, and a neo-Russellian version.
32 A third reason:  the speculative explanations illustrate the neo-Russellian idea that a
person can believe and entertain a single proposition under different guises.
33 There are good reasons for thinking that English is not your language of thought, such
as Kripke’s Paderewski case (Kripke 1979).  But, for convenience, we ignore these
matters here.
34 We believe that Schiffer (1981) first introduced the belief box terminology.
35 Strictly speaking, a person entertains a proposition by having a sentence in his
entertainment box.  But in what follows, we will often say that a person entertains a
sentence, such as (1) or (2).  By this we will mean that the person has that sentence in his
entertainment box, and thereby entertains the proposition expressed by the sentence.
36 Our conception of a file is similar to Perry’s (1980).  Perry, however, tends to think of
files as (something like) collections of open formulas, whereas we tend to think of them
as collections of closed sentences containing names.
37 For simplicity, we will often write of ‘double lives’, but not all simple sentence puzzle
cases involve double lives—for example, some such cases involve ‘St Petersburg’ and
‘Leningrad’.  Our explanation is meant to apply to these other cases as well.
38 Presumably, the sentence ‘Superman is Clark’ is present in each person’s ‘Superman’
file and each person’s ‘Clark’ file.  But see note 39 below.
39 This is so even though the identity sentence ‘Superman is Clark’ is (presumably)
present in a typical enlightened person’s ‘Superman’ file and ‘Clark’ file.  One reason a
typical enlightened speaker may (nevertheless) fail to make the substitution inference is
55
                                                                                                                                                
that the identity sentence may remain inactive when she opens her ‘Superman’ and
‘Clark’ files, or may become less active than other sentences in the files.  (This low level
of activity may, in turn, be due to the fact that typical speakers think less often about
Superman/Clark’s double life than they do about his other attributes.)  If so, then the
identity sentence will not be entertained, and the substitution inferences that it licenses
will not be performed.
40 There are vexing questions about accuracy conditions for images that we won’t try to
decide here.  Consider the image you formed when you heard (2).  Is it accurate if some
bespectacled man (of a certain appearance) went into a phone booth and some caped man
(of a certain appearance) came out?  Or does its accuracy require that Superman/Clark
himself, while bespectacled and appearing a certain way, went into a phone booth, and
that Superman/Clark himself, while becaped and appearing a certain way, came out?  In
short, are the accuracy conditions of images general or singular?  We don’t know.  But it
doesn’t matter for our purposes, because, whether singular or not, these images do differ
in their accuracy conditions.
41 This may be the sort of explanation that Ostertag (1998) has in mind.
42 Of course, the ordinary speaker's retraction is also compatible with the semantic and
implicature theories.  These theories could claim that the coaching results in a change in
context that gives rise to different propositions either semantically expressed or
conversationally implicated.  But we have already given reasons to reject those views.
43 Of course, identity sentences like (3) are also standard philosophical examples that
contain occurrences of two names, but they don’t provoke strong anti-substitution
intuitions.  We say below (and in note 44) why we think they do not.
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44 If the sentence that you are considering is an identity sentence containing two names,
then the unconscious presumption of non-coreference either never arises or is
immediately overridden.
45 For Levinson’s work on pragmatics and anaphora, see Levinson 2000, especially
chapter 4.  For an introduction to Discourse Representation Theory, see Kamp and Reyle
1993.  An explanation along Levinson’s lines would claim that an utterance of (1)
triggers a generalized conversational implicature that the names ‘Superman’ and ‘Clark
Kent’ fail to co-refer.  Levinson thinks that such implicatures are default, overridable
assumptions or inferences.  Such Levinsonian implicatures differ from Barber’s
implicatures in two respects.  First, the Levinsonian implicatures concern co-reference,
whereas Barber’s implicatures concern aspects.  Second, the Levinsonian implicatures are
false, and thus do not satisfy (MP), whereas Barber’s implicatures are supposed to be true
and satisfy (MP).  One might wonder whether syntactic constraints on referential
dependence (e.g., Chomsky’s Binding Condition C on co-indexation) play some role in
creating the presumption of non-coreference.  We think not, for the two names in
sentence (2) occur in two different clauses that are joined by conjunction; it’s thus
unlikely that a syntactic theory would entail anything about their referential dependence,
or lack thereof.  (Thanks to Jeffrey Runner for discussion of this last point.)
46 Braun’s theory does not say that speakers’ belief-sentence intuitions are due to the sorts
of mistakes that we think occur during typical speakers’ evaluations of (1)-(2*).  In fact,
one of us (DB) thinks that ordinary speakers resist substitution more strongly in belief
sentences than in simple sentences, and that this is evidence that our explanation of
simple-sentence intuitions cannot be extended to belief sentences.
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47 Some readers of Saul (1997) might think that she endorsed the following argument.
She did not.  See section 2 for a description of her argument in that paper.
48 As far as we know, Braun’s (1998) theory and Soames’s (2002) theory are the only
ones.  Braun uses neither semantics nor implicatures to explain anti-substitution intuitions
about belief sentences.  On his theory, speakers who have these intuitions usually do not
entertain propositions whose truth-values match their intuitions. According to Soames,
speakers who utter belief sentences containing names (such as ‘Lois believes that
Superman flies’ and ‘Lois does not believe that Clark flies’) usually assert propositions
that ascribe belief (or lack of belief) in descriptive propositions (e.g., the proposition that
Lois believes that the person who wears a red cape, Superman, flies, and the proposition
that Lois does not believe that the bespectacled reporter, Clark, flies).  Soames says that
these asserted propositions are neither semantically expressed nor conversationally
implicated, but do explain anti-substitution intuitions.  Thus, Soames’s theory is also
inconsistent with (MP).  However, it is much closer in spirit to (MP) than Braun’s theory.
In particular, it assumes that intuitions are to be explained by propositions whose truth-
values match those intuitions—only these propositions are asserted rather than
semantically expressed or conversationally implicated.  For some critical discussion, see
Braun 2002.
49 Thanks to Paul Pietroski for helping us to see this.
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many useful comments and discussions.  Thanks especially to Paul Pietroski, who was
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